Zilele acestea am avut ocazia sa ascult problema precedentului Kososovo discutată până la epuizare. Problema se pune de obicei astfel: credeţi că există un precedent? – Da. Sau: credeţi că există un precedent? – Nu. Sau, „…dar totuşi, ţinând cont că…, nu credeţi că…? Se remarcă slaba definire (operaţionalizare) a noţiunii de precedent; astfel încât se întâmplă uneori ca dintre doi-trei invitaţi fiecare să aibă, în felul său, dreptate. În textul de mai jos voi încerca să pun întrebarea despre Kosovo în mai multe feluri astfel încât să obţinem nişte rezultate viabile.

Este Kosovo un precedent pentru ceva, orice? Părerea mea este că da. Kosovo leagă între ele două lucruri mai degrabă independente până acum: crimele în masă şi integritatea statală (pe baze juridice şi istorice). Daca Nurnberg responsabilizează conducatorii organizaţiilor „criminale”, precedentul Kosovo pare sa responsabilizeze statele care tolerează crime în masă faţă de cetăţenii care supravieţuiesc acestor crime.

Dacă paragraful de mai sus e corect, atunci forţa precedentului stă tocmai în caracterul său limitat. Drepturile omului sunt încălcate de fiecare dată când un om este ţinut în arestul poliţiei o zi in plus faţă de cât prevede legea, sau ori de câte ori o revistă porno este interzisă. Totuşi aceste probleme rămân de competenţa statelor şi doar în prezenţa unor crime sistematice şi bine documentate (prin gropi comune, de exemplu), precedentul ar putea intra în acţiune.

Este Kosovo un precedent pentru alte state? Deja această întrebare mă depăşeşte, şi am colegi de blog mult mai competenţi să răspundă.

Este Kosovo un precedent pentru Transilvania? Teoretic, da. În cazul în care armata română ar trage cu tancul pe stradă în Harghta si Covasna, sau dacă s-ar găsi gropi comune prin păduri, sau dacă s-ar raporta violuri colective, atunci UDMR sau oricine altcineva ar putea cere o formă de autodeterminare. Până atunci, practic, nu. Şi asta nu deoarece „modelul românesc” este un succes. Ci pentru că (atâta vreme cât), dacă nu ar mai fi un succes, statul român ar folosi în continuare poliţia şi nu forţele speciale.

Dar lucrurile acestea le vom auzi de la politicieni, atata vreme cat genocid (sau cuvinte asemanatoare) sunt tabu.

Andrei TIUT

A recent article titled “A Tale of Two Allies” which was published in the American newspaper Christian Science Monitor has sparked furore in the Romanian media. In brief the article accompanied in the electronic edition of the Christian Science Monitor by an interview with A. Wess Mitchell, Director of Research at the Center for European Policy Analysis in Washington D.C. analyzes the way in which the United States of America deals with its allies in Europe. The article basically argues, using Poland and Romania as examples, that the United States of America classifies its allies in two categories: mature allies-partners which do not require coaxing, as the article argues and another category (which I call it allies of opportunity, since the article fails to give a proper category) with which the United States has a relation based on reciprocity.

Wess Mitchell argues that this sort of relation is employed by United States in dealing with less important allies, while at the same time it expects from mature allies such as Poland or Britain to support the US foreign policy without quid pro quos. The latter type of relation is criticized as alienating important allies and reinforcing the perception that the US does not take into consideration the interests of its allies. In Wess Mitchell’s opinion this type of thinking with regard to mature allies has developed after the Cold War as a result of the American unipolar moment.

The US-Romanian relation is described as being carefully cultivated by American policy makers in Washington, with the US being careful to reciprocate any concession made by the Romanian government and maintain the appearance of a balanced alliance, not an asymmetrical one. The article does not criticize Romania in any way instead it focuses its criticism on the US, arguing that the same type of relation based on reciprocity must be employed towards older and far more important allies so as not to alienate them.

What then caused the swift reaction of the Romanian media? Well this article came at a delicate moment. Romania is in the midst of a political crisis which pits against each other president Traian Basescu and prime-minister Calin Popescu Tariceanu. Romanian foreign policy has also been affected by this political crisis, as the president is a staunch Atlanticist, while the prime minister favours a foreign policy aligned more with the positions of the European Union. Furthermore the publication of the article coincided with the visit of Russian president Vladimir Putin to Bulgaria, which resulted in the energy agreement between Russian and Bulgaria that virtually compromises the Romanian sponsored Nabucco project. The article also contains a quote form an undisclosed Pentagon source which describes Romania as a minor American ally over the long term. Last but not least in recent time the US-American relation has come under scrutiny as a result the handling of incidents involving US diplomats as well as the long deployment of Romanian forces in Afghanistan and Iraq.

It is evident that the Romanian press overreacted over the meaning of the article published by the Christian Science Monitor. Nevertheless it also raises questions about the nature and utility of American and Romanian relations. The United States remain at the moment the most important ally Romania has and the alliance has been instrumental for Romania in gaining NATO membership. From the American of view Romania proved to be a staunch ally that supported US foreign policy after 9/11 and allowed access to US influence and power in the Black Sea, a region which has been until recently impervious to American foreign policy. As such the relation represents a stable partnership; however it might be threatened by the current unstable climate in Romanian politics, a rise in anti-American feeling in the country and the inability of Romanian authorities to explain the importance of this alliance to the Romanian public.

George VIŞAN

Hans Morgenthau, one of the most remarkable thinkers in international relations, argued that the difference between internal politics and foreign policy is not a difference of kind, but of degree. Another great theorist of international relations, Raymond Aron, argued that a political unit, meaning a state defines itself partially by being capable of external action – foreign policy. Using these two theoretical benchmarks as starting points for this article I will argue that the current crisis in Romania’s internal politics have affected its foreign policy in a negative way. This article is the third instalment in the series of articles dedicated to Romania’s foreign policy.

Since summer 2005 Romania has seen a political struggle between its President Traian Basescu and Prime Minister Calin Popescu Tariceanu. Originally they were both political allies, being the leaders of the coalition that managed in 2004 to take the power from the social democrats. The rift between the prime minister and the president has affected the conduct of foreign policy in many ways. As a result Romania’s foreign policy has become less effective and efficient. Their differences concerning foreign policy can be put also on their opposite views regarding international politics: president Basescu is an atlanticist, while Tariceanu has been a firm supporter of EU positions concerding major issues of international politics.

The rift between the president and the prime minister had become evident for the first time in June 2006 when Calin Popescu Tariceanu decided to withdraw Romanian forces from Iraq, circumventing the normal chain of foreign policymaking and failing to inform Romania’s allies.

A second instance when the conflict between the president and the prime minister affected Romania’s foreign policy occurred when the minister of Foreign Affairs Mihai Razvan Ungureanu was forced to resign at the request of the prime minister. Mihai Razvan Ungureanu had been perceived by many, including colleagues from his own party as a supporter of the president. Calin Popescu Tariceanu asked for his resignation when he failed to inform the prime minister about an incident in which two Romanian workers were involved and had been detained by US forces. His replacement, Adrian Cioroianu has been a continuous source of controversy, the Romanian press never missing an opportunity to criticize him. Even president Basescu had reluctantly accepted Adrian Cioroianu’s nomination as foreign affairs minister, the liberal Government having to put his nomination before the Constitutional Court and accusing the president of not properly discharging his functions.

The replacement of the foreign affairs minister had come at a crucial point for Romania’s diplomacy. During his term in office Mihai Razvan Ungureanu began a process of reform and renewal of the institution, with an emphasis on improving consular affairs and human resources. Adrian Cioroianu has become notorious as a result of his behaviour in a number of occasions and his lack of experience. The most recent cases when the behaviour of the foreign minister has come under scrutiny of the press regard his unguarded comments on television regarding the fate of Romanians who commit crimes abroad and a perceived braking of the protocol while accompanying the Romanian president in a visit to Spain.

Romanian foreign policy has been affected by the current internal political crisis in its substance, not only in terms of leadership. Recently Romanian foreign policy has come under attack by Moldova’s president Vladimir Voronin, who is leaning strongly towards Moscow now and never misses an opportunity to attack Romania for alleged imperialist tendencies. Ukraine has continued its policies regarding sensitive issues such as the Bastroe canal and the establishing of the maritime border between the two states. In a recent visit to Bucharest president Iushcenko declared that the construction of the Bastroe canal represents a vital interest for its country and is not subject to negations. Furthermore he visited the Serpents’ Island whose status is subject of a litigation in the Hague between Romania and Ukraine.

Romania’s image in Europe and the defence by state officials of the rights of Romanians working abroad have come under heavy criticism after an incident in Italy, which led the Italian government to enact a law that allows the expulsion of EU citizens without due process. Furthermore a few days ago Italian energy giant ENI signed an agreement with its Russian counterpart, Gazprom signed a deal for the building of the Bluestream gas pipeline, which threatens the Nabucco project.

Romanian foreign policy reacted slowly to these events and has not come up with proper responses. The causes for this incoherence may be found in the inner workings of the system however a great deal of responsibility must be placed on the current political crisis which makes almost impossible the formulation of a coherent and consistent foreign policy. It is vital that the current political crisis Romania be solved as it offers opportunities for rivals to compromise Romanian interests and credibility abroad.

George VIŞAN

In urma mediatizarii presupusului delict comis de cetateanul roman Nicolae Mailat de etnie roma, aflat ilegal in Italia, opinia publica din peninsula a reactionat de multe ori prin mesaje xenophobe si rasiste, mesaje in procent ingrijorator de mare promovate de figure politice, in special apartinand dreptei spectrului politic.

Spatiul politic italian este poate unul dintre cele mai relevante exemple de cum opinia liderilor politici se reflecta aproape instantaneu asupra opiniei cetatenilor de rand. Un rol semnificativ il joaca mijloacele de informare in masa, in special televiziunile cu acoperire la nivel national: Rai 1, Rai 2, Rai 3, Rete4, Canale 5, fiecare dintre acestea favorizand un partid sau altul. O pozitie moderata am remarcat-o la televiziunile La7 si RaiNews, care cel putin deocamdata, fac nota discordanta in acest sens. Senzationalul atinge cote maxime in Italia, in senul ca sunt stiri care pe parcursul a saptamani intregi se opresc asupra unui eveniment, astfel lasand la nivelul psihicului colectiv perceptia ca evenimentul respectiv este de o importanta vitala pentru viata de zi cu zi. Din fericire o parte a cetatenilor italieni constientizeaza gradul de influenta a mass mediei in acest sens, insa nici pe departe nu reprezinta majoritatea.

Literatura de specialitate (in special cea sociologica) subliniaza o deja inradacinata “teama de invazie” a italienilor de catre non-italieni, de cele mai multe ori denominati “straini”. Pentru o mai clara viziune trebuie facute cateva precizari privind istoricul migratiei italiene. Pana in anii 70 Italia a trait o experienta diversa de cea de astazi, din punctul de vedere al fluxurilor migratoare. Incepand cu o doua jumatate a secolului al XIX-lea si pana in perioada interbelica, o mare parte a italienilor a fost protagonista fenomenului “Great Emigration” catre Statele Unite, Australia, deseori si America Latina. In perioada post-belica aceasta experienta se muta pe continental european, in special in Elvetia si Germania. In anii 50 si 60, “boom-ul economic” a facut astfel incat fluxul migrator catre alte teritorii sa se diminueze substantial. Apoi, anii 70 si 80 l-au reluat, insa, de aceasta data in sens invers, transformand Italia din tara de emigratie, in tara de imigratie. Daca in acesti ani fluxul de imigranti provenea in mare masura din tarile Magrebului, Africa subsahariana, America Latina sau Asia sud-estica, in anii 90, odata cu destramarea blocului sovietic, acesta s-a intensificat semnificativ cu valul migrator originar in Europa central-orientala: Polonia, Romania, Ucraina, Rusia.

Astfel, in ciuda prezentei constant crescande a populatiei straine in Italia, prima lege care a raspuns in mod responsabil situatiei de facto a fost creata in 1998 – legea Turco-Napolitano, realizata de Ministrul Afacerilor Sociale si respectiv al Internelor de la acea vreme. Aceasta lege, spre deosebire de cele precedente (Testo Unico di Polizia din 1931, legea 943/1987 si legea Martelli din 1990) incearca sa creeze cadrul legislativ propice pentru cetatenii non-italieni, fie ei comunitari sau extracomunitari, veniti in Italia in cautarea unui castig financiar mai mare decat cel de care ar fi putut dispune in tara de origine. Asadar, odata cu legea 40/1998 (Turco-Napolitano) se materializeaza si Testo Unico delle leggi sull’immigrazione, care inglobeaza toate legile in materie, fiind valabil pana astazi, cu anumite modificari.

Cu noua guvernare de centru-dreapta apare in 2002 legea Bossi-Fini, care sub forma unor amendamente aduse Testo Unico-ului inaspreste conditiile legale de accesul pe teritoriul Italiei si ofera instrumentele necesare (de exemplu “contratto di soggiorno”) reducerii numarului de cetateni non-italieni aflati in ilegalitate (fie clandestini sau overstayers – a caror documentatie legala care sa permita sederea nu a fost reinnoita). In momentul de fata, in parlamentul italian se afla o propunere de lege menita sa modifice acele parti precare ale legislatiei in vigoare.

Realitatea, unpolitically correct spus, “strainilor” romani in Italia ridica probleme care par sa nu aiba rezolvare, cel putin la nivel legislativ.

In linii mari, perceptia actuala a multor cetateni romani aflati pe teritoriul italian se manifesta printr-o precautie crescanda in ce priveste interactiunea sociala cu cetatenii italieni. Daca in perioadele de “liniste mediatica” aceastia incearca integrarea in aceasta societate, in perioadele de “zgomot mediatic” (vezi cazul Mailat) se izoleaza segmentand si mai mult, cel putin la nivelul imaginarului colectiv, spatiul social italian deja multietnic.

Cu ce se ocupa marea majoritate a romanilor in Italia? Conform surselor oficiale majoritatea romanilor barbati lucreaza in constructii, pe cand majoritatea femeilor sunt fie menajere, fie ofera asistenta necalificata batranilor sau copiilor. In categoria minoritara se incadreaza studentii si prostituatele.

Unde locuiesc romanii in Italia? De regula, cei care se afla in posesul permisului de sedere, in modul cel mai sigur au o locuinta decenta (vila, bloc cu etaje, case); cei aflati ilegal isi gasesc adapostul fie la cunostinte (cei mai norocosi), fie la locul de munca (menajerele), fie in baraci (construite in zonele periferice ale marilor orase), fie in gari sau pe strazi.

Cum castiga romanii in Italia? In medie, castigurile “strainilor” (printre care si romani) se incadreaza in functie de zona geografica (crescatoare dintre Sud spre Nord), tipul muncii prestate (fabrica, intreprinderi mici si mijlocii, munca independenta), legalitatea activitatii (licita sau ilicita). Oricum, salariile de regula se incadreaza de la 700-800 EUR/luna pana la 1.500-2000/luna.

Pentru o apreciere cat mai realista ar fi utila o abordare substantiala privind fiecare aspect, incapand cu accesul la frontiera si finalizand cu obtinerea cetateniei de catre cetatenii ne-italieni “straini”.

Mihaela Ghimci

La ora la care scriu acest text pare destul e sigur ca votul uninominal va fi legiferat probabil in o formă sau alta. Nu sunt foarte sigur de entuziasmul trezit de acest sistem, şi aş fi preferat net să fie introdus la o singură cameră ca să avem ocazia să testăm rezultatele. Articolul de faţă examinează consecinţele combinaţiei potenţiale cu un sistem parlamentar unicameral. Ca şi „uninominalul”, „unicameralul” ar fi o idee agreată oricând de electorat; şi chiar au fost promovate în paralel la un moment dat.

După părerea susţinătorilor votul uninominal produce o mai mare legitimitate a parlamentarului, bazată pe relaţia mai stânsă între politicieni şi electorat. Iarăşi după părerea susţinătorilor, parlamentului unicameral acesta duce la o mai bună eficienţă a activităţii legislative. Nu doresc să contest aici nici legitimitatea nici eficienţa sporită. Pe de altă parte, dată fiind actuala clasă politică, aceste două caracteristici pot face mai mult rău decât bine.

Argumentul meu în acest sens ar putea părea fără sens deoarece votul uninominal este promovat ca o schimbare a clasei politice. Totuşi nu avem motive suficiente să acceptăm această poziţie. Pe de o parte, nu ni se aduc exemple relevante din ţări care au trecut la uninominal; pe de cealată parte, primarii aleşi individual în România nu sunt un model de corectitudine şi eficienţă.

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În mod cu totul de înţeles, votul uninominal îi este „vândut” votantului sub un argument populist. Acest argument presupune implicit că electoratul este înţelept şi coerent în dorinţele sale. Pornind de la aceste premise, cauza răului stă în îndepărtarea politicianului de „popor”. Dacă ne-am alege în mod direct reprezentanţii atunci ei ar fi mai buni şi ar înţelege mai bine ce vrem noi. („Cand vor intelege caldura sufleteasca transmisa de jos in sus, adica venita din …suflet de la majoritatea electoratului, vor putea simti si cum frige capacul …”) Argumentul cu eficienţa parlamentului unicameral se susţine şi singur, dar odată cu sporirea legitimitaţii parlamentarilor el capătă cu atât mai multă forţă.

Totuşi democraţia constituţională însemnă cu totul altceva decât „putere pentru popor”. Dimpotrivă ea protejează minorităţile, descurajează referendumul, introduce intervale de amânare a deciziei, obligă la dezbateri. „Poporul” nu este nici deştept şi nici prost; el este chemat să valideze în mod regulat oferta politică, însă atunci alege între pachete de politici şi echipe de oameni (chiar şi în uninominal, unde adeseori rămân doar partidele mari). Dincolo de limbajul deja puţin obscur şi de elitismul autorului, Federalist no. 10 rămâne o demonstraţie excelentă despre cum democraţia constituţională (= „republica”) este o formă de limitare şi nu de întărire a puterii majorităţilor de opinie.

Dincolo de timpul cheltuit prin dubla votare a legilor în bicameralism, prima costituţie nu prevedea mari măsuri de ponderare a deciziei politice. Totuşi de atunci încoace s-au făcut progrese atât pe plan constituţional cât şi în societatea civilă. În momentul de faţă avem două dezbateri în camere, dar un singur vot hotărâtor. Pe de altă parte, proiectele trebuie să fie supuse dezbaterii publice vreme de o lună. Avem deci mai multă dezbatere şi o decizie simplificată. Deficienţele votului pe listă au fost expuse clar opiniei publice şi, ca atare, avem mecanisme de control din exterior („Coaliţia pentru un parlament curat”) şi încercări de control din interiorul partidelor (alegerile interne PSD).

Să presupunem, deci, că, de mâine, vom avea parlament unicameral ales prin vot uninominal. Experienţa alegerilor locale de până acum îmi permite să estimez că noul parlament ar putea fi altfel decât până acum (mai carismatic), dar nu mai competent şi, aproape sigur, la fel de coruptibil. În acest timp mecanismele nosatre (ale societăţii) de control asupra lor (politicienilor) vor avea nevoie de cel puţin 4 ani ca să se refacă. Iar ei (politicienii) vor fi mai legitimi şi mai rapizi decât erau până acuma.

În definitiv de ce avem nevoie de reforma clasei politice? Pentru că partidelor le lipsesc mecanisme de autoreglare. Iar nouă mecanisme reglare a aşteptărilor noastre şi de control asupra aleşilor. Lucrurile acestea au fost rezolvate în vestul Europei la nivelul societăţii în destul de mult timp. Noi dorim conform unei tradiţii venerabile (puţin ca vechime ) să le rezolvăm la nivelul statului şi, dacă se poate, imediat.

Andrei TIUT

This is the second instalment from the series of articles regarding Romanian foreign policy I promised I will publish on this blog. In this article I will discuss and comment the draft 10 year foreign policy strategy which has been recently published by the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Actually the word strategy does not properly describe the document – it is more a list of priorities and objectives for Romania’s diplomacy for the next ten years. In this respect the word strategy is a misnomer – but for practical purposes, I will refer to it as a strategy (the document is meant to ignite a public debate concerning Romania’s foreign policy in the next decade).

When first reading the document one is struck by two important features: the first is the general character of the document and the second one is its scope. It must also take into consideration that this is the first time ever a draft foreign policy strategy has been open to public debate. Furthermore when discussing and considering the document one should bare in mind that it is meant to spark a public debate concerning foreign policy, therefore some of the data and prescriptions for action in the document are given in general terms, not specific. The general character of this particular document allows in principle a serious discussion regarding the priorities and opportunities for Romania’s foreign policy. There are some parts of the document which are not adequately developed – my guess is that these represent issues of low priority to Romania’s diplomacy or issues that are currently shaping, and a stance on the part of Romania has yet to be formulated. The areas of major interest for Romania are very well highlighted in the document, these are: NATO, European Union, alliance with the US, relations with Russia, relations with Moldova, the issues of the West Balkans, the Black Sea region, energy security and participation in international organizations. However the document makes no mention of the resources available to Romania’s foreign policy in order to fulfil its interests and goals in the areas of interest listed.

The strategy mentions that Romania considers NATO as the main organization guaranteeing the security of Europe. Romania has set as one of its foreign policy objectives the promotion of closer ties between EU and the Republic of Moldova, western involvement in the peaceful resolution of the conflict in Transnistria and cultivating better ties with this particular state. In terms of Romania’s relation with Russia, which have cooled lately, Romania aims at building and maintaining a pragmatic relation based on mutual interest and in the larger context of the European Union’s relations with the Russian Federation. As to Ukraine, a country with which Romania has ongoing disputes concerning its maritime borders and the building of the Bastroe canal, Romanian aims are the building of a balanced, stable and predictable relation.

Considering the second feature of the document – its scope – one is surprised that a country like Romania is interested in issues ranging from promoting human rights and democracy to Africa. Such a foreign policy agenda has been usually identified with Great Powers – a thing that Romania is not and does not hold ambitions to become one. However given the anarchic nature of the international system in general, and its current configuration in particular it is useful for a small power like Romania to be at least aware of the current issues at stake in international politics, even if some may hold little practical importance to its national interest. Under the conditions of anarchy a state must always be aware of the issues shaping the system, as at some point in time they may either pose a threat to its interests or offer an opportunity to further those interests. In terms of explicit foreign policy objectives seeks to become a policy shaper in both NATO and the European Union. Other goals identified by the foreign policy strategy include: increasing Romania’s contribution to the security of the international system, increased involvement and diplomatic activity inside international organizations, promoting Romanian economic interests (especially in the energy sector – see the Nabucco and PEOP projects), promoting democracy, security and stability in Romania’s near abroad, maintaining the country’s status as an important partner for dialogue with state from different regions of the world, promoting and protecting the rights of Romanian citizens abroad as well as promoting Romanian culture and identity abroad.

In conclusion, giving an answer to the question in the title is difficult. The document under scrutiny provides a sort of mind map to the issues and challenges Romanian foreign policy and diplomacy has to find adequate solutions to in the near future. Furthermore the document also proves a certain openness to input from individuals and organizations outside the government apparatus. Such a document can offer only a partial answer to whether or not the Government has a coherent action plan in terms foreign policy.

George VIŞAN

În momentul de faţă există trei forţe care se confruntă în conflictul din Justiţie, fiecare cu o anume relaţie cu un centru de putere politic. CSM-ul este o instituţie a „vechiului regim” din, cel construit după înţelepciunea PSD. Ministrul Chiuariu este un liberal reprezentând un guvern liberal. În sfârşit procurorii DNA au fost numiţi de preşedinte la propunerea ministrului susţinut de PD, Monica Macovei.

Mulţi oameni pe care îi respect susţin o parte sau alta în acest conflict. În general ei cred că există o parte bună şi una rea, împărţind apele în reformişti şi antireformişti, adepţi ai independenţei justiţiei sau ai statului poliţienesc. Nu sunt sigur însă că o asemenea claritate în concluzii are o bază raţională. Nici una dintre cele trei grupări nu a confirmat că merită o asemenea investiţie de încredere.

Până de curând DNA era măcar o tânără speranţă - după ce a invitat în câteva săptămâni mai tot guvernul să dea declaraţii imparţialitatea sa e mai greu de susţinut. (Este improbabil din punct de vedere statistic să ai o asemenea concentraţie de corupţie şi neglijenţă într-un guvern încât, DNA acţionând în mod egal, larga majoritate a numelor grele care sunt descoperite să fie miniştrii în funcţie).

Ar fi interesant de făcut, cred, o analiză a stării actual a justiţiei ca sistem în care diverse părţi luptă pentru resurse şi supravieţuire. Aş propune cu plăcere schiţa completă a unei asemenea analize, doar că nu am nici informaţia şi nici baza teoretică pentru aşa ceva; o să pun totuşi în rândurile de jos cea mai bună aproximaţie pe care o pot oferi şi cele mai bune întrebări pe care mi pot pune.

Tind să văd Justiţia ca un fenomen mai puţin dependent decât înainte de 2004, deşi nu neapărat mai puţin politizat. Să zicem că dl Chiuariu protejează interesele lui Relu Fenechiu; că preşedintele Băsescu îşi urmăreşte interesele prin domnii Morar şi ţuluş; că prin CSM se protejează dinozaurii din sistem şi relicvele din PSD - toate acestea ar fi lucruri rele. Pe de altă parte vestea bună este că relele măcar se anihilează. Vedem astfel că Guvernul nu este protejat de anchete, că DNA nu este protejat de controale, că situaţia celebrei comisii de la Cotroceni e clarificată de unele incompatibilităţi (nu toate!), că lui Năstase i se mai face un dosar. Acestea din urmă sunt lucruri pe care nu avem de ce sa le regretăm.

Această luptă de putere ar putea spori nesiguranţa marilor rechini, obligaţi să se teamă se pericole din mai multe părţi. Ar fi însă extrem de interesant să aflăm efectele în cadrul sistemului judiciar la nivel de magistrat individual. Un judecător/procuror poate dori să intre în sistem, să supravieţuiască, să fie avansat, să ia şpagă, să obţină respect, sau (mai ştii) să facă dreptate. Un sistem corupt şi monolitic descurajează unele dintre aceste dorinţe, dar le susţine şi controlează pe altele, totul setat într-un mod relativ simplu astfel încât să încurajeze conformismul şi să descurajeze independenţa.

Într-un sistem în care marii actori se confruntă frontal apare însă posibilitatea de a decide între diferite loialităţi. Dacă forţele lor se anihilează în suficientă măsură, atunci protecţia regulilor poate deveni (teoretic) mai puternică pentru unii indivizi decât cea a afilierilor. În lipsa unor informaţii din lumea mai puţin văzută a justiţiei, nu putem totuşi şti dacă asemenea lucruri se întâmplă sau nu.

Este posibil că nu vom şti niciodată. Ceea ce eu am numit până acum sistem este, strict vorbind, o stare temporară a sistemului juridic, cauzată aparent de o stare temporară a celui politic. Peste un an-doi vom vedea probabil o altă stare, mai bună sau mai rea.

Andrei TIUT

This article is the first in a series of articles that I will publish on this blog dealing with Romania’s foreign policy. In this article I will outline the major international issues Romania’s foreign policy has to deal with in the international system. I will provide a brief description of these major issues and I will comment them according to their relevance. The other articles in the series will deal with the new draft ten year foreign policy strategy which has just been published by the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and with the cohesiveness and coherence of Romania’s foreign policy – with a major emphasis on the relations between the branches of the executive and internal political conflicts. The issues are divided according to their importance, relevance and urgency.

The alliance with the United States of America – represents the cornerstone of Romania’s foreign policy. It is a mutual beneficial relationship that has propelled Romania into NATO and has opened up bases, although not permanent, for the United States on the Black Sea. Lately the relationship has been a source of controversy in Romanian internal politics, with regard to its contribution in the war against terrorism. Moreover the prolonged deployment in Iraq and Afghanistan of Romania’s troops, with no end in site in the near future for both conflicts, puts tension on a generally beneficial relationship and has sparked controversy in Romanian politics.

NATO – represents the formal link between Romania, Western Europe and the United States of America, in terms of security. By joining NATO and becoming an important player in the alliance, despite its size and power, Romania proved that it can contribute to the overall security of the alliance and became a factor of stability in a region of Europe known for its political troubles. Moreover by becoming a member of NATO, it has extended the range of the alliance in a region which previously received little attention and was generally considered to be under the influence of Russian power: the Black Sea. As a result of Romania’s efforts and contribution the 2008 NATO summit will be held in Bucharest.

The Black Sea region has become since 2004 a focus of Romania’s foreign policy, however with mixed results. This region has become important in the last years because of its proximity to the Middle East and as an important link to the energy rich region of the Caucasus. Romania holds an important asset in the region, the port city of Constanta the only deep water on the Black Sea. However a coherent Black Sea policy is yet to be formulated and Romania is likely to face opposition from other states in the region such as Turkey and Russia who have their own vested interests.

Russia remains a huge challenge for Romania’s foreign policy. A coherent policy regarding relations with the Russian Federation has yet to be formulated by the Romanian government. In the last years the relations between the two former Warsaw pact allies has steadily grown colder as the result of Romania’s joining NATO and becoming a US ally. Furthermore the establishing of American military bases on the Black Sea, albeit troops will be stationed on a rotational basis, has added fuel to the fire. Russian energy policy has also been criticized quite vocally by president Traian Basescu and Romania is struggling to push forward the Nabucco pipeline project which will bring the oil Caucasus to EU markets, bypassing thus Russian territory. Besides these two issues another point of contention between Russia and Romania is the resolution of the internal conflict in the Republic of Moldova as well as the withdrawal of Russian forces from Transnistria, according to international treaties.

Relations with Ukraine represent another important issue in Romania’s foreign policy. The relationship has been dominated by two controversial Ukrainian projects as well as issues regarding minority rights. The first and most important issue is the delimitation of the continental shelf and of the exclusive economic zones of
Romania and Ukraine in the Black Sea, an issue which revolves around the establishment of the arcane fact whether the Serpent’s Island, a former piece of Romanian territory, is just a rock or an island. Despite the scholastic nature of the argument, this island or rock is a key strategic point in the Black Sea, as it can extend or seriously limit access to key energy resources located offshore. Also the island can be used as a strategic point from which one can survey navigation coming from Romania’s shores. A second major point of conflict between the two states represents the building by Ukraine of a canal on the Danube – Bastroe, which Romanian authorities have opposed on the grounds that it poses a threat to the delicate ecosystem of the Danube Delta. Actually the canal is seen by Romanian authorities as a possible threat to its control of the lower Danube as well as an economic challenge to its canal, built further upstream, which links Danube and the Black Sea, and ensures the transports of goods from the Rhine to the Black Sea region. Romania’s relations with the Ukraine have been tensed by the way in which both states choose to resolve the disputes between them: the former prefers diplomatic engagement and settlement through various international organizations, while the latter prefers a policy of the fait accompli.

George VIŞAN

In its basic sense the doctrine of integration argues for a global consensus or a global compact that will define the threats and the challenges of the new era and, very important, will define new rules for the management of the international system.

First the new rules regulating the post 9/11 international system should be developed around new core concepts-conditional sovereignty, responsibility to protect, responsibility to prevent, that should become the pillars of a new doctrine of international community responsibility (along the directions developed in the so-called Blair Doctrine articulated in the 22nd April 1999 speech).

At a second level this doctrine “would seek to translate this commitment into effective arrangements and actions”. At this level the doctrine of integration aims to gradually develop a procedural consensus on the institutions and mechanisms designed for the management of the international system. All in all the doctrine of integration aims to provide a stable institutional framework capable of an integrated and concerted response in order to deal with the post 9/11 security challenges. According to Haass the fundamental task for a 21st Concert is that of reforming the multilateral security system in order to provide to international society the necessary tools, means and assets to deal with today security threats and also to create an institutional infrastructure, an institutional acquis that will assume the tactical management of the system. The doctrine of integration intends to promote a coherent strategic response, a concerted approach that will sustain global security arrangements that will manage common risks with a shared responsibility of tackling them. Today’s international security challenges demand collective answers, global arrangements and tools that will project a concerted approach for today’s new strategic imperatives. Finally, the practical aim of this strategy should be the pooling of power, institutional capacities and assets in order to create a community of action fulfilling the security tasks of the international society.

I think that the ultimate purpose of a grand strategy built on this conceptual basis (liberal internationalism and doctrine of integration) should be the project of building a functional infrastructure of global governance (James Steinberg, An Elective Partnership: Salvaging Transatlantic Relations, in Survival, Summer 2003,page 130) capable of enforcing a constitutional international order (built around the new rules of responsibility to protect, conditional sovereignty ) and using US power, the Euro-Atlantic community and the concert of democracies as vital assets of the international order.

A fundamental point should be made on the concert of liberal democracies concept. In order to become a vital functional asset of the international society assuming and enforcing the responsibility to protect as a core duty of a rule based international order/ or a constitutional international order, the treaty establishing this concert should adopt also a formal clause of structured cooperation similar to the one incorporated in the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Art.I-40: “those Member States whose military capabilities fulfill higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish structured cooperation within the Union framework.”

This will mean not only creating standby multinational capacities capable of assuming the whole operational complexities of the Petersberg tasks or even the most demanding scenario that of expeditionary war as the NRF (NATO Response Force) is tailored for but also developing an infrastructure for operational planning, joint training and clear standards of interoperability. The Concert of Liberal Democracies should become an enforcement community, a crisis response community focused on developing high readiness capabilities around the European concept of multinational battle groups-some small speedy projectable units prepared for rapid insertion in some very demanding security circumstances. The Concert of Liberal Democracies should be focused on developing a pool of standby and high-readiness capabilities and assets in order to provide to the international society a critical mass of crisis response forces.

Engaging the world as a liberal Leviathan in order to recast the international system, to remake the world around new constitutional rules governing the use of force and making states accountable to the international society, is a must.

The US should not solve all the world’s problems by itself….but it should use this extraordinary window of opportunity provided by the unipolar moment for creating a multilateral “infrastructure of capacity and cooperation” (Ikenberry) capable of projecting a networked response in order to enforce the rules and norms of a constitutional international system.

American policy makers should use the unipolar opportunity to prepare the world for the post-unipolar era by designing a constitutional order and security arrangements that should gradually develop concerted power-projection capabilities for crisis response.

The US should use its unipolar assets in shaping a constitutional design for a post-unipolar moment era, an era far beyond the old classic geopolitical rivalries defined by a 21 st century Concert (Haass) and by a liberal Leviathan (Ikenberry): an enforcement community with networked power–projection capabilities for crisis response; this era should be fundamentally defined as a post-Westphalian world with an hyper institutionalized order structure reflecting a doctrine of international community responsibility (built around the new emerging norms such as conditional sovereignty, responsibility to protect, responsibility to prevent). A constitutional order should be developed as a widely integrative framework offering status-quo incentives to the potential revisionist players.

Octavian Manea

The entire debate on the US post 9/11 grand strategy was generated by the necessity of proposing an alternative strategic worldview to the one articulated by George W. Bush Administration, highly influenced by the so-called neoconservative moment. The administration’s grand strategy crafted to help America to navigate in a post 9/11 security environment was the neoconservative revolution, and I will try to take a very brief snapshot of it: a neo-con America means basically a discretionary unipolar power liberated from any constraints, check and balances mechanisms; a discretionary Leviathan that enforces a global order that reflects US basic/ontological values; a neo-con America is fundamentally not a status-quo power, but a revolutionary power, an enlightened revisionist power that has the will to use its unipolar assets in order to democratize the world and alter the non-liberal status-quo; a neo-con America will naturally use coalitions of willing and will reject the formal entangling alliances that set constrains on US unipolar power.

I think that the alternative in crafting the US post 9/11 national security security consists in mixing the core ideas of liberal internationalism with the so called doctrine of integration. United States should become a liberal Leviathan (Jonh G. Ikenberry) in the center of a liberal order: an uberpower (Josef Joffe) constrained by a liberal constitutional international order; a friendly-user uberpower constrained by constitutional devices and mechanisms at the interaction with the international system; a liberal Leviathan should devise a grand strategy that intends to build an international order that integrates great powers in a constitutional setting. A constitutional international order will gradually integrate the other great powers that could become responsible stakeholders and pillars of the constitutional order.

The greatest task of a Liberal Leviathan should be that of devising some constitutional mechanisms that will govern the post-Westphalian world politics by projecting a post-Westphalian axiological and procedural consensus on the values, norms and institutions that will manage the post 9/11 international system.

In my opinion the core idea of a grand strategy built around this conceptual system (liberal internationalism and the doctrine of integration) is that of making US power acceptable for the international system. Once again United States will become a friendly user of power, exercising its power through a multidimensional system of networks (alliances and binding institutions) that will impose/create a constitutional system of checks and balances thus making US power accountable. The interaction between the US power and the international system will be mediated by this vast array of binding institutions (systems of rules and constitutional devices) that will make the projection of the unipolar power restrained, benign and acceptable.

The United States should once again pursue an enlightened self-interest by projecting its power in order to provide to the international society an essential public good- a multilateral institutional infrastructure for global governance. This multilateral infrastructure should become the central pillar of a system of consensual rule-based governance.

One of the primary tasks of a liberal order is that of providing an architecture of binding institutions and cooperative mechanisms in order to produce/generate an institutionalized collective response for the management of the post 9/11 security environment. Basically the liberal internationalism is a theory for creating international order by designing/projecting an architecture of binding institutions with the purpose of enforcing a constitutional/a rule-based international order (Ikenberry).

A capital role in building a liberal order should be given to the doctrine of integration, articulated by the former director of the US Department of State’s Policy Planning (from early 2001 to mid 2003) Richard Haass. Basically the doctrine of integration “would aim to create a cooperative relationship among the world’s major powers, built on a common commitment to promoting certain principles and outcomes” (Haass) in order to provide a stable framework for the management of the post 9/11 security environment. At this first level the vital step is that of the gradual development of a normative consensus on the values, principles, norms and the rules of the road, in order to develop a common and a stable framework/an international and a cognitive consensus for the conduct of the international relations. According to Haass the world’s major powers should once again forge a global consensus on a certain core issues of the international relations-“to develop understandings, rules of the road about the conduct of the international relations”.

Octavian Manea