Daniel Ortega and Dmitry Medvedev

How democracies perish is a very old question and the various answers given by political science are still disputed. How young and unconsolidated/aspirant democracies perish is an easier question, given the fact that some concrete lessons are offered generously these days, and their charm seems irresistible for would-be autocrats.

The very much praised phenomenon of democratic diffusion during the wave of democratization in Latin America since the 1970s seems to be undermined at the beginning of this century by another type of diffusion, of an authoritarian kind this time. The authoritarian diffusion manifests itself in various fields, but what is striking is the fact that the attacks against the media, the party system, the institutional checks and balances or the civil society are replicated from one country to the next, in a continuous process of imitating and learning from your neighbor the art of destroying democracy by just simply  asserting your democratic credentials and good intentions.

A couple of weeks ago, the Supreme Court of Nicaragua ruled with an exceptional swiftness that one article of the Constitution is unconstitutional. The accused article concerns the prohibition to be re-elected as President for a consecutive mandate. In addition, the constitution stipulates that no person can occupy this function for more than two mandates. The president of Nicaragua is a former guerilla leader of the leftist Sandinista group and in 2011 he will end his second non-consecutive term. However, Daniel Ortega wants a new term and therefore he managed to by-pass the decision of the Congress (the proper way to amend constitutional articles) and asked the Supreme Court to decide. The case is aggravated by the fact that the Supreme Court was not in complete formation, meaning that only the Sandinista judges (named by the President) were present and adopted the ruling, before the rest of the judges, coming from the opposition, could reach the session.

The possibility of being re-elected in a presidential regime is a much disputed issue, with followers on each side. The strongest argument pro re-election would be the possibility to keep the president accountable and more responsible (if he wants another term of office and is not satisfied with just one “hit-and-run” mandate), whereas the other camp warns of the dangers posed by a president with so much power, especially in countries with very weak legislatives, frail party systems and civil societies. In the Latin American world, this executive power is exacerbated also by the collusion between the judges in the Supreme Court and the president responsible for their nomination. Whatever the conclusion between these two situations – an unaccountable president or one with too much formal and informal leverage, it is clear that the Madisonian tradition of strong checks and balances is absent, as it is also the skepticism of the founding American father towards any individual occupying a seat of power – and the limited number of fixed mandates is precisely that formal obstacle against autocrats.

The situation in Nicaragua is serious in itself, but what should also be taken into account is the striking similarity with the case of Honduras since June this year. Four months ago, the Honduran democracy suffered a number of very severe attacks against its formal democratic institutions, and especially the Constitution. Manuel Rosales Zelaya, the former president, exiled after being officially accused of undermining the Constitution and the rulings of the Electoral Court and the Congress against several tentative efforts to push a non-constitutional referendum, is now struggling to return as the de jure president of Honduras and finish his term. The international community in an almost complete formation (UN, EU, the Organization of the American States and the US) threatened to ignore the results of the November general elections (presidential and parliamentary), although planned prior to the events leading to the exile of Zelaya and lawfully organized under the authority of a democratic and legitimate Electoral Court, backed by the approval of the Congress.

Had the US and the Obama administration ignored this tiny Central American country and its political conflict between the populist president Zelaya on the one side and the representatives of the legislative and the judiciary on the other, Honduras would be a storm in a teacup for some researchers of Latin American affairs. As it unfolded since the start of the campaign initiated by Chavez in order to back his ally in ALBA (Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas), to which Barrack Obama immediately rallied, together with all the Latin American countries, Honduras is a dramatically important case in the so-called third wave of democratization. Honduras is a young democratic polity, still struggling with various obstacles to its institutional consolidation, the institutionalization of the rule of law (and especially the strengthening of its judiciary, a major Latin American challenge) and the nefarious corruption linked to the clientele networks made possible by a very strong executive, the President, unsystematically checked by the other branches of power, the legislative and the judiciary. The latter is all the more vulnerable, considering the huge role the president plays in the nomination of some of the judges in the Supreme Court and their dependence on the President’s party in Congress, especially when his allies possess a majority in the legislative.

Honduras is such an exceptional case because this unconsolidated democracy, highly dependent on foreign aid (European and American) for long-term projects aiming at democracy building (institutional consolidation but also civil society support), managed to protect the democratic order four months ago, by opposing an illegal referendum pushed by the President in total disregard with the provisions of the Constitution. In this case the Congress was backed by the Electoral Court, the Supreme Court and the Ombudsman. However, they made one great error and exiled Zelaya, which triggered the legitimate but inflated reaction of the international community. Instead of backing the decision of the democratically elected Congress, the US decided to push for the return of Zelaya as president and an amnesty law, therefore overruling the Honduran legislative and judiciary. The sad irony these days is that the same US announced the signing of a successful deal to reinstate Zelaya with the approval of the Congress and the Supreme Court. After the deliberation in the congress and the probable reinstatement of a golpista president, this effort would close a full circle of non-sense, in which the leading democracy in the world sides with Chavez, Castro and Ortega to give a blow to a rule-of-law-abiding parliament so that a president which obviously transgressed the constitution could be legitimated and returned to his seat of power.

After the presidential elections in Honduras this winter, in which Zelaya is not a candidate (a condition of the signed agreement), everything could return to normal in this country, but the lesson has been learned by the neighboring incumbent president of Nicaragua, Daniel Ortega. Not only that he can use the power of this precedent, but he is also free from some nasty obstacles that Zelaya had to deal with: an independent legislative and judiciary, a strong political opposition with the courage to protect the principle of the rule of law and the horizontal accountability (Guillermo O’Donnell), that the president tried to elude in order to consolidate his power. Nicaragua is in a far worse situation with respect to its state of democracy and far more embroiled in the not so transparent activities of his friend Hugo Chavez, the president of the oil-rich Venezuela and the leader of ALBA. He is the president who offers these days the most interesting lessons for would-be dictators trying to cope with independent media, opposition parties and the legislative or judiciary branches.

These two cases of presidential abuses of power on the side of the leftist-populist camp mentored by Hugo Chavez should not make us ignore a similar case of presidential excess in Colombia as we speak. The Colombian president Alvaro Uribe is now at the end of his second mandate and already set in motion the formal procedures in order to amend the constitution and call for a referendum at the beginning of the next year so that he can be re-elected. At the end of the day, the difference between the Colombian amendment of the constitutional text and the case of Nicaragua is only a difference of style: the former president, enjoying high rates of popularity and a more friendly relation with the opposition and the other branches of power, decided to take a more elegant path toward his re-election. Manuel Zelaya, unfortunately for him, had the entire political and judicial elite against him and a relatively strong media to report his illegitimate moves. Daniel Ortega, however, is the most carefree of the three presidents considered here. He didn’t have to fight a resilient Supreme Court or to confront a unified Congress against his move. He just brought together a couple of his brave Sandinista men from the Supreme Court and convinced them that one tiny constitutional article is simply “inapplicable”.

Andreea Nicuţar

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Parlamentul Suediei (Riksdag)

Sunt deja doi ani de când ziceam:

Să presupunem, deci, că, de mâine, vom avea parlament unicameral ales prin vot uninominal. Experienţa alegerilor locale de până acum îmi permite să estimez că noul parlament ar putea fi altfel decât până acum (mai carismatic), dar nu mai competent şi, aproape sigur, la fel de coruptibil.

Privind înapoi aproape că ma mir cât de timidă este critica pe care o aduceam atunci acestui sistem. Astăzi dacă aş vorbi despre uninominal aş avea desigur cuvinte mult mai aspre.

Totuşi trebuie recunoscut că proiectul „uninominal-unicameral” a pornit la drum având nu doar sprijin popular ci şi coerenţă intelectuală. Să pornim analiza de la parlamentarul român ca individ. Cu o mână (vot uninominal) îl responsabilizăm faţă de electorat iar cu cealaltă (parlament unicameral) îi dăm mai multă putere; la sfârşit vom avea un Parlament care să fie şi legitim şi eficient.

Prima parte a acestui proiect a fost implementată complet, însă deocamdată este un eşec răsunător. Astăzi, ca şi în mandatul trecut, putem şti cum va vota un parlamentar dacă ştim în ce partid se află şi cine îi mediază accesul la resurse. Mai mult, actualul Parlament este, cel puţin până la moţiunea de cenzură, exemplar prin inactivitatea sa.

Să zicem că e „prea devreme” sau  că factorul Băsescu generează clivaje prea puternice, coalizând natural „pentru” sau „împotrivă” – fapt e că îmbunătăţiri nu se văd. Totuşi preşedintele Băsescu, şi implicit PDL, ne propun să completăm votul uninominal prin construirea unui Parlament unicameral cu număr restrâns de parlamentari.

Bine, dar de ce?

Economia la buget e un argument prea populist ca să fie luat în seamă. Rapiditatea deciziei e un argument valid dar … nerelevant. Unicameralul trebuia să fie reforma tehnică ce ar fi urmat reformei morale a clasei politice, şi nicidecum un scop în sine. Existenţa a două Camere asigură un nivel adiţional de control, exercitat nu de Parlament (căci există o singură Cameră decidentă) ci de opinia publică; aceasta are ocazia să afle din timp ce legi sunt în proces de adoptare şi ce critici li se aduc.

Vom avea referendum şi deci vom avea dezbatere. Nu mă tem prea tare de rezultat. Mă tem însă de calitatea dezbaterii. De voie de nevoie diverşi intelectuali vor vorbi şi vor scrie discursuri al căror fir logic se  reduce la: ştim că nu aveţi încredere în parlamentari: hai să le scădem controlul.

Andrei TIUT

Complexitatea şi bogaţia unei opere este, cel mai adesea, o bună măsură a valorii şi perenităţii acesteia. În cazul operei lui Edmund Burke, a lui Benjamin Constant şi a lui Alexis de Tocqueville, această observaţie nu are nevoie de precizări suplimentare. Totuşi, atunci când sunt aduşi în discuţie aceşti trei mari gânditori politici, care au trăit şi scris în epoci diferite, persistă o profundă ambiguitate, ba chiar o confuzie,  cu privire la mesajul lor filozofic fundamental, o confuzie care a luat amploare în a doua jumătate a veacului XX. Aşadar, sunt aceşti filozofi politici reprezentaţi ai liberalismului sau ilustrează gândirea conservatoare şi conservatorismul?

Ambiguitatea în ceea ce priveşte mesajul central al filozofiei lor politice derivă din procesul  istoric prin care, atât ideile lui Burke, Constant sau Tocqueville, cât şi evenimentele capitale care le- au subdeterminat opera şi gândirea, sunt în permanenţă interpretate şi reinterpretate pentru a oferi noi răspunsuri sau puncte de sprijin pentru înţelegerea şi evaluarea  unor noi evenimente, a unor noi idei, a unor noi fenomene social-politice. Acest lucru poate fi observat limpede la autorii conservatori anglo-saxoni din a doua jumătate a secolului XX, care au făcut din cei trei gânditori europeni – şi mai ales din Edmund Burke - nişte precursori ai conservatorismului american şi britanic din această perioadă. Cu toate acestea, o scurtă privire asupra ideilor şi biografiei celor trei este suficientă pentru a demonstra – fără a diminua câtuşi de puţin complexitatea şi unicitatea gândirii fiecăruia – că atât Burke, cât şi Constant sau Tocqueville au fost, s-au considerat ca atare şi sunt unii dintre cei mai mari filozofi politici liberali.

Edmund Burke, deşi a fost transformat de Russel Kirk în părintele conservatorismului american, a fost în epocă un membru al partidei Whig şi nu al Tory, gruparea politică a conservatorilor. În această calitate, s-a implicat în disputa constituţională privind prerogativele monarhului, susţinând limitarea puterii regale; a avut un rol decisiv în eliminarea unor legi care restrângeau libertatea comerţului cu grâne, una dintre cauzele principale pentru care vor lupta liberalii manchesterieni de mai târziu; a criticat abuzurile East India Company (un monopol mercantilist) faţă de populaţia de pe subcontinentul indian; în sfârşit, fiind el însuşi pe jumătate irlandez, a susţinut emanciparea catolicilor, s-a împotrivit pedepsei capitale şi a criticat utilizarea curentă a toturii în cadrul pedesele aplicate în epocă.

Dar aproprierea lui Burke de către conservatori se face în temeiul opoziţiei sale faţă de Revoluţia franceză, uitându-se că începutul Revoluţiei a fost primit cu încântare şi entuziasm de politicianul englez, care vedea evenimentul ca pe o bătălie în favoarea libertăţii.  Numai odată cu excesele iacobine cvasi-totalitare ale revoluţionarilor francezi Burke devine un critic al mentalităţii constructiviste – cum va spune Friedrich A. Hayek, discipolul său spiritual din secolul XX -, autoritare şi sângeroase ale Revoluţiei.  Că Burke nu a fost, în plan politic, un conservator – fie şi în cel mai restrictiv sens al acestui termen – stă dovadă sprijinul său pentru Revoluţia americană şi pentru doleanţele revoluţionarilor americani – taxele prea ridicate percepute de Coroană în colonii.

Ca şi Burke, Benjamin Constant este un critic virulent al exceselor Revoluţiei, dar şi un apărător al ideilor liberale afirmate în prima etapă a acestui eveniment fundamental al istoriei europene şi mondiale. Constant – un cartofor şi un libertin – este cel care îmbogăţeşte gândirea liberală în lumina acestor evenimente teoretizând două mari pericole, de importanţă egală,  la adresa libertăţii individuale : despotismul monarhic sau autoritarismul unui grup restrâns cât şi despotismul maselor sau al democratiei absolute şi nelimitate. În aceasta constă valoarea şi perenitatea distincţiei făcute de Constant între libertatea anticilor şi a modernilor.

Ca personaj politic, Constant a întreţinut relaţii inconstante cu oamenii şi grupările politice ale timpului, dar niciodată cu ideile liberale. A fost un critic virulent al lui Napoleon, după care a încercat o reconciliere cu acesta în schimbul adoptării unei constituţii care ar fi limitat drastic, după o interpretare originală a  modelului britanic, puterea împăratului; a încercat o apropiere faţă de Ludovic al XVIII-lea, după ce acesta a anunţat adoptarea Cartei, dar a fost epurat de conservatori din guvern imediat după Restauraţie; în sfârşit, va susţine “Revoluţia din iulie” în 1830 şi pe “regele-cetăţean” Louis-Phillippe d’Orléans împotriva vechii dinastii a Bourbonilor.

Alexis de Tocqueville este cel care, în multe privinţe, preia ştafeta de la Contant în contextul francez. Este membru al partidului liberal, susţine ca deputat abolirea sclaviei şi reformarea administrării coloniale, este un participant activ la Revoluţia de la 1848, un critic al mişcăriii socialiste şi ministru de externe în guvernul provizoriu instalat în februarie; în sfârşit, când Ludovic Bonaparte va lua puterea prin lovitură de stat, eveniment care încheie aventura liberală franceză de la 1848, Tocqueville se va număra printre opozanţi, va fi arestat, încarcerat şi scos din viaţa publică.

Tocqueville a fost un aristocrat dintr-o familie veche, dar a susţinut întotdeauna poziţii liberale. Ca şi Constant, el întelege că Revoluţia din 1789 a reprezentat un amestec de idei bune şi de idei rele, dar că procesul declanşat cu această ocazie este inevitabil.  Vechiul Regim, centralist şi absolutist, a fost din nefericire înlocuit cu un regim caracterizat prin aceleaşi neajunsuri, cu singura excepţie că suveranitatea nu mai era monarhică şi divină, ci proclamată în numele poporului. Aşa cum îi demonstrează şi călătoria sa în Statele Unite, democraţia nelimitată, ca orice fel de putere politică nelimitată, nu este nepărat de preferat puterii nelimitate a unui singur om. Chestiunea de fond nu este cine deţine puterea, ci cât de mare este această putere şi cât de mult poate ea afecta libertatea indivizilor.

Tocqueville, Constant şi Burke, ca orice alţi mari gânditori, nu pot fi reduşi la o singură trăsătură de penel. Ei au încercat să înţeleagă evenimentele epocii lor, la care au participat din plin, reflectând în acelaşi timp asupra idealurilor umane universale. Cu siguranţă nu împărtăşeau aceleaşi idei asupra tuturor lucrurilor. Cu atât mai puţin aceleaşi gusturi, capricii sau moravuri. Libertinul Constant nu ar fi fost probabil invitatul preferat al lui Tocqueville la masă, şi invers. Dar în ce priveşte filozofia politică, este greu de ignorat convergenţa gândirii lor şi mesajul eminamente liberal al acestora, în sensul de baza, clasic, al acestui termen.

Bogdan C. Enache

Bogdan Enache a purtat un dialog cu profesorul Vladimir Tismăneanu pe tema situaţiei şi perspectivei stângii Europene. Întregul text îl găsiţi pe blogul domnul Tismăneanu.

Rezultate parţiale ale alegerilor din Germania. Courtesy of International Spiegel Online

Duminică a avut loc in Germania bilantul marii coalitii CDU-CSU si SPD. Angela Merkel rămâne cancelar, dar într-un peisaj politic transformat în mod radical. Alegerile pentru Bundestag din 27 septembrie au produs mai multe surprize şi chiar câteva recorduri istorice pentru sistemul de partide german, aflat într-o proces de masive transformări, care cu siguranţă vor continua în anii următori. In primul rând, a devenit şi mai evidentă decât în 2005 transformarea sistemului de partide într-o competiţie cu cinci actori, chiar şase dacă socotim CDU şi CSU în mod separat, cu atât mai mult cu cât CSU,  gruparea creştin conservatoare din Bayern, este al treilea partid în ordinea mărimii în noua coaliţie de centru dreapta a cancelarului Merkel.

Mai mult, această arenă multipolară tinde să apropie foarte mult scorurile partidelor traditionale mari, Uniunea CDU-CSU şi SPD, de performanţele celor trei partide mai mici, FDP, Die Linke, si Verzii. Astfel, la aceste ultime alegeri Uniunea a obţinut cel mai slab scor din istoria postbelică (33.8%), cu excepţia primelor alegeri din august 1949, când a înregistrat doar 31%. SPD, cel de-al doilea partid mare, a atins in această toamnă recordul minim în toată istoria sa electorală din 1949 încoace – doar 23% au obţinut partenerii lui Merkel în „Marea coaliţie” formată în 2005, după plecarea lui Gerhard Schröder. In schimb, liberalii din FDP au reuşit o performanţă care i-a surprins chiar şi pe liderii acestui partid care sta in opoziţie de 11 ani, de la plecarea cancelarului Helmut Kohl. Cu 14.6% din voturi, cel mai bun rezultat din 1949, FDP intră în noua coaliţie de centru dreapta cu un scor mult mai bun decât cel obţinut de CSU şi, foarte util în viitoarele negocieri de posturi cu doamna Merkel, alături de o Uniune a conservatorilor mai slabă decât în trecut, în general în jurul pragului de 40%. Mai mult, FDP este cu mai putin de 10% in spatele SPD, al doilea partid în ordinea mărimii după alegeri, ceea ce face foarte verosimilă ambiţia liberalilor de a lupta de aici încolo pentru aceasta poziţie cu social-democraţii.

La această apropiere în termeni cantitativi a FDP de partidul cancelarului Merkel putem adăuga un alt avantaj pe care liberalii lui Guido Westerwelle cu siguranţă vor încerca să îl fructifice în următoarele săptămâni de discuţii. Campania Uniunii CDU-CSU a avut ca temă schimbarea, adică depăşirea etapei „marii coaliţii”, compromisul din 2005 care a făcut din cancelarul Merkel mai degrabă un mediator al celor două mari tabere politice decât purtătorul promisiunilor liberale din campania de acum patru ani. Acum s-ar oferi ocazia ca această viziune liberală să fie pusă în aplicare şi probabil că acesta este motivul pentru care noua alianţă de dreapta a fost preferata alegătorilor. Iar această schimbare de direcţie a fost tema majoră a liberalilor, într-o măsură mult mai mare decât a cancelarului Merkel care, deşi şi-a manifestat dorinţa unei guvernări de centru-dreapta, a menţinut până în ultimele săptămâni un culoar deschis pentru o eventuală refacere a marii coaliţii cu SPD. Acest avantaj al FDP în negocieri este cu atât mai mare cu cât, potrivit primelor analize ale votului dat duminică, Uniunea a pierdut voturi mai ales în favoarea FDP sau, în cel mai bun caz, alegătorul tradiţional conservator a decis să îşi împartă cele două opţiuni, un vot acordându-l candidaţilor conservatori în diverse circumscripţii (die Erststimme), preferând să aleagă în schimb lista FDP (die Zweitstimme), pentru a mări astfel şansele unei majorităţi de centru-dreapta. Coroborată cu succesul FDP în a mobiliza alegători tineri, neînregimentaţi, strategia votului împărţit a fost profitabilă pentru dreapta, dar impulsul major a fost dat de liberali.

Pe de altă parte, o parte semnificativă din alegătorii social-democraţi au decis să nu voteze duminică sau au migrat către Die Linke. Această tendinţă nu are însă un efect coagulator pentru stânga germană, fiind foarte cunoscută reticenţa unei aripi semnificative a social-democraţilor în a bate palma cu Die Linke la nivel federal. Aceştia din urmă au înregistrat o creştere importantă faţă de 2005 şi au reuşit chiar să câştige poziţii consistente în vechile landuri, prefigurându-se astfel ieşirea acestui partid din ghetoul estic, unde electoratul fidel este compus din cetăţeni asistaţi social, bătrâni sau şomeri, nemulţumiţii sau perdanţii post-reunificare şi o parte a social-democraţilor dezamăgiţi de orientarea liberală a SPD. Mai mult, Die Linke pare să se simtă destul de bine poziţionată pentru a invita SPD să se reformeze şi să se „resocialdemocratizeze”, revenind astfel în zona stângii, pe care ar fi părăsit-o sub vraja exercitată de Merkel, aşa cum declara Gregor Gysi, liderul formaţiunii. Pe de altă parte, nici Verzii nu sunt un partener de dialog foarte comod pentru SPD, iar scorul lor este în continuare unul bun (10.7%) şi le dă speranţa că au o şansă în a-şi stabiliza electoratul fidel şi poate în a-l extinde.

Tocmai aici intervine poate cea mai interesantă dintre surprizele produse de acest ultim scrutin. Toate cele cinci partide susţin că sunt deja sau vor deveni în cel mai scurt timp partide populare (Volksparteien). Rămâne de văzut în ce măsură vor reuşi ele această performanţă într-o perioadă în care strategiile de fidelizare a electoratului par din ce în ce mai neputincioase până şi pentru cei doi mari ai sistemului, conservatorii şi social-democraţii. Cu exceptia populaţiei în vârstă (>50), care votează în continuare în mod previzibil, electoratul este mult mai fluid, aceasta în situaţia în care decide să meargă la vot. O altă tendinţă în alegerile federale este tocmai scăderea prezenţei la urne. Cu toate acestea, fragmentarea preferinţelor electoratului, coroborată cu aceste declaraţii curajoase de fidelizare a unui electorat cât mai divers ale tuturor celor cinci actori mari, pare să sugereze o transformare a sistemului partizan german în următorii ani. In orice caz, scorul cumulat al partidelor de locurile 3, 4 si 5 nu poate fi ignorat. Acestea au obţinut 37.2%, la care se adaugă alte 6% acordate unor partide care nu au trecut pragul electoral de 5%.

Cea mai interesantă evoluţie este desigur cea din polul stângii, care se va afla în opozitie în următorii patru ani. O stânga departe de a fi unită, dar care va trebui să ofere un răspuns coerent guvernării de centru-dreapta. Or, tocmai coerenţa este cel mai dificil obiectiv, tocmai pentru că dialogul dintre SPD si Die Linke este unul oficial limitat până în 2011 cel puţin, atunci când liderii social-democrati vor decide o eventuală alianţă federală cu un partid pe care în prezent îl consideră nereformat (prea multe figuri ale PDS, partidul succesor al comuniştilor est-germani) si prea puţin prezentabil din punct de vedere democratic pentru a-i oferi o trambulină spre reprezentarea la nivel naţional. In orice caz, strategia adoptată în campania din ultimele săptamâni nu a fost una profitabilă pentru SPD. Acesta nu a reuşit să ofere un răspuns provocării lansate dinspre Die Linke, asa cum am discutat într-un articol recent, iar scăderea record până la 23% a fost cauzată tocmai de această inabilitate de a-şi afirma în mod credibil poziţia dominantă în stânga spectrului politic. Această lipsă de imaginaţie politică este responsabilă şi pentru faptul că marii perdanţi ai „marii coaliţii” au fost social-democraţii, consideraţi în acelaşi timp ori prea liberali – de către electoratul de stânga, ori principalul obstacol pentru ieşirea din criză – pentru electoratul liberal sau conservator.

In următoarele zile se vor negocia posturile în noua coalitie, iar prezenţa liberalilor în câteva poziţii cheie în economie sau la externe va fi un subiect de maxim interes pentru orice observator, dar la fel de importante sunt şi deciziile privind viitorul unor lideri ai SPD si consecinţele acestora asupra viitoarei strategii a partidului în opoziţie. Intr-o mare măsură, de această strategie depinde reconfigurarea stângii germane şi, în mod implicit, a întregului sistem de partide.

Andreea Nicuţar

A ground-based interceptor lifts off from Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif., Dec. 5, 2008. (DoD photo by Joe Davila, U.S. Air Force/Released)

The President of the United States, Barack Obama has announced on September 17, a major shift in the policy of the US concerning the deployment of anti-ballistic missile defenses in Central and Eastern Europe in order to protect its European allies from a possible Iranian threat. In this article I will argue that this move is a part of a larger strategy of retrenchment, designed to make American power more flexible and adaptable in an international system defined both by symmetrical and asymmetrical threats. The move does not signal by any means a waning of America’s commitment to Europe’s security or for that matter, the security of Central and Eastern Europe. Canceling the deployment of the Ground Based Interceptors in Poland and the X band radar in the Czech Republic does not mean the United States is giving up on creating a national missile defense capability.

President Barack Obama’s arguments for this shift in policy are based on two factors. First it appears that a reassessment of the Iranian threat and its implications has been carried out by the American intelligence community and a conclusion has been reached that the threat posed by Iran’s missiles is not as great as it was first estimated. Rather than investing in expensive technologies to counter an Iranian threat that has yet to materialize, the administration is investing in capabilities that are able to deal with this threat now or in the near future. The second factor that influenced the administration’s decision on European missile defense deals with the technology available at this moment to the United States to counter the threat of Iranian missiles to Europe and the way in which to respond to it. The United States is confident enough that the current technology at its disposal is potent enough to deal with Iran’s missiles. It is also confident enough that Iranian missile technology is not as advanced as it was once thought and it has yet to produce the long range ballistic missiles required to reach Western and Central Europe. Rather than countering a capability that Iran does not posses the US is now targeting Iran’s medium and short range ballistic missiles. Furthermore the United States would like to introduce a level of uncertainty in its relationship with Iran, and this shift in strategy does exactly this.

This new approach on ballistic missile defenses is consistent with promises made during the 2008 US presidential campaign, during which Barack Obama pledged that it will re-evaluate the plans for the development and deployment of the anti-ballistic capabilities. It appears that such an evaluation has taken place and has led to a policy shift concerning the deployment of elements of the American missile shield in Europe. Such a move was expected and has not come as a complete surprise to the Czech and Polish governments. On the other hand the United States is not giving up on the development of a national integrated anti-missile defense system. The 2010 defense budget provides funding for further development of such a capability.

Poland and the Czech Republic should not view the canceling of the deployment of the ground-based interceptors and of the X band radar on their territories as a signal that the United States is not interested anymore in guaranteeing their security. Indeed for some members of the Czech and Polish political elites, this shift in the American security strategy was a bitter pill to swallow. These countries are staunch American allies in Europe and have provided political and military support during the US intervention in Afghanistan and the invasion of Iraq and display strong pro-American feelings at the societal level. Former Czech Prime Minister Mirek Topolanek said American plans not to deploy elements of the ballistic missile shield in Europe “is not good news for the Czech state, for Czech freedom and independence”. Equally bitter feelings were expressed by former Polish president and leader of the Solidarność movement, Lech Walesa, who stated that “The Americans have always only taken care of their own interests and they have used everyone else.” On the other hand both Polish and Czech publics were not convinced of the necessity of deploying anti-ballistic missiles in their countries and large majorities of these countries’ citizens opposed American plans to deploy BMD defenses.

For the Poles the news that the United States was not going to deploy anti-ballistic missile in their country came at a bad moment, as the country was commemorating 70 years to the day since the Soviet Union had invaded Poland. For many Poles and Czechs the deployment of American anti-ballistic missiles on their countries’ territories was a guarantee against Russia extending its influence in Central and Eastern Europe. However despite the canceling of the deployment of the ground based interceptors and of the X-band radar, it is likely that Poland and the Czech Republic received some sort of political and military compensation from the United States. The US cannot ignore these countries’ military and political contributions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Furthermore the United States has not given up completely on the deployment of anti-ballistic missiles in Poland and the Czech Republic. However, instead of ten ground based interceptors it will deploy starting in 2015 mobile ground based Standard SM-3 missiles which can deal with Iranian short range ballistic missiles. According to the American Secretary of Defense, Robert S. Gates talks have been initiated with both Polish and Czech governments to deploy on their territories Standard SM-3 missiles from 2015 onwards.

What does this American shift in strategy concerning missile defense mean for Russia? Superficially it seems a great victory for Russian diplomatic intransigence on the issue of ballistic missile defenses in Europe. Russia was opposed from the very beginning to the deployment of ground based interceptors and the radar supporting them in Poland and the Czech Republic as it meant that the US was projecting power very close to what Moscow defines as its “near abroad” – the former Soviet Space. Technically 10 missile interceptors and a radar station were not much of a military threat, given the large Russian nuclear tipped ICBM arsenal. However it established the dangerous precedent of US projecting power in Central and Eastern Europe very close to Ukraine. Furthermore the X band radar that should have been installed in the Czech Republic peered deep into Russian territory and could have been used to give advanced warnings to NORAD if the Kremlin ever decided to launch an ICBM. It is also apparent the Russians feared that US could have installed nuclear warheads on the ground-based interceptors and used them as a first strike weapon. However this current shift in American strategy does not spell the end for missile defense in Europe. The US will deploy in the near future anti-ballistic missiles from its Aegis equipped cruisers and destroyers stationed in the Mediterranean Sea and the North Sea. Furthermore the US will eventually deploy Standard SM-3 missiles in Poland and Czech Republic from 2015 onwards and will install a radar facility in the Caucasus. Although the Obama administration has promised cooperation with Russia on the BMD issue, the presence of American military hardware in the Caucasus will not go down very well in Moscow.

On the diplomatic front Russia is forced now by the United States to make up its mind on the Iranian question. The Russians have not been very keen on strengthening the sanctions regime against Iran because of American support for Georgia and Ukraine to join NATO and the deployment of anti-ballistic missiles in Central and Eastern Europe. The American change of strategy on the deployment of BMD defenses in Poland and the Czech Republic actually puts pressure on the Kremlin to take action against Iran on the nuclear matter. If the Russians actually continue to support Iran, as they did before the American announcement of September 17, the US will begin taking retaliatory measures against the Kremlin. Russia therefore should not gloat too much over the American decision not to deploy BMD elements in Central and Eastern Europe.

Will this shift in strategy concerning missile defense mean less US commitment to European security? Actually no. It will open up more opportunities of engagement between the Europeans and the United States in security matters, in a time where US diplomacy is perceived as being more concerned with the Middle East, Afghanistan, Pakistan and the challenge of the rising powers of China and India. Furthermore by concentrating on the threat posed by short range and medium range Iranian missiles, the United States will deepen its commitment to European defense.

Conclusion: The United States has not given up on its plans of deploying ballistic missile defenses in Europe. It has however shifted its strategy on this issue in order to gain leverage at the negotiations table concerning Iran’s nuclear ambitions and to respond to more immediate threats. It appears that this shift in American strategy is a part of a policy of retrenchment and as such it is fraught with risks and inherent dangers. However if this policy of retrenchment succeeds it will increase the security of the United States and that of its allies.

George VIŞAN

At the beginning of this month, two very troubling reports on the state of democracy in the world have been released almost simultaneously, and both are concerned with the highest locus of legitimacy and authority when dealing with democracy and human rights, the UN and, most specifically, the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), the successor of the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) since 2006. The first research is Freedom House’s annual report on the activity of UNHRC and the second was released by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR). This article will present the conclusions of these two reports, briefly corroborating their results with the most recent Freedom House’s Freedom in the World Report (2008) scores on political rights and civil liberties (a scale from 1 to 7, 1 for the highest degree of freedom, and 7 for the lowest level).

The first analysis is the Freedom House UNHRC Report, an annual report that evaluates the activity of this inter-governmental body of the UN and its official reactions to various cases of human rights violations in the world. The research uses 5 benchmarks totaling 11 criteria in order to asses the efficiency of the UNHRC in light of its declared goals, and concludes with a very grim evaluation:

A failing grade in 4 of the 11 criteria: Adoption of resolutions and use of special sessions; the global threat against freedom of expression; voting records of democracies during Council elections; voting records of democracies on key resolutions.

A mixed grade in 6 other criteria: Relevance and independence of special rapporteurs;   Universal Periodic Review process; the global threat against freedom of association; accreditation process for NGOs; mixed opportunities for NGO engagement at the Council; level of U.S. engagement at the Human Rights Council.

A pass grade in one of the 11 criteria: Quality of special rapporteurs and reports.

Additionally, the Report highlights a significant number of other vulnerabilities of this body, which could affect its ability to further assess human rights violations and take appropriate measures. One of these vulnerabilities is the continuous pressure some countries exercise in order to eliminate the country-specific rapporteurs, that is the assessment made by an independent team on the ground in specific countries, favoring instead the Universal Periodic Review (UPR), a process by which the monitoring is realized by member states working together with the state under scrutiny, every four years. Moreover, these reports allow a very large space to maneuver for the regime under scrutiny to manipulate the process of investigation.

Another pressing case is the meager capacity of this intergovernmental body to issue condemnatory resolutions on those countries that are involved in grave violations of human rights. Belarus, China, Cuba, Sri Lanka, Equatorial Guinea, Libya, Laos, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Zimbabwe, Chad, Eritrea, Saudi Arabia, Syria, have been exempted of such resolutions, whereas Israel received a disproportionate number of condemnations on the same charge.

The freedom of expression received a significant blow from some members that push for the passing of resolutions against “abuses of freedom of expression” on race or religion. Most of these propositions are furthered so as to prohibit “anti-Islamic or blasphemous speech”, Pakistan, as a delegate of the OIC (Organization of the Islamic Conference) countries being the sternest advocate of such a resolution.

The 47 seats of this body are distributed proportionally along the five regional groups of states designated by the UN, and the seats are most often decided inside each group, instead of allowing free competition for the seats.

The accreditation of the NGOs is in the hands of a politicized committee made of the member states representatives, thus making the official approval of NGOs an arbitrary decision of national governments, sometimes ranked as non free (the case of Russia, China, Cuba, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Cameroon etc.) or partly free by the very reliable FH Freedom in the World Index.

The ECFR report covers the activity of the UNHRC during the 2008-2009 session and focuses mainly on the relative weight of the EU inside the UN body and its ability to forge a stable majority in the decision-making process reflecting the liberal-democratic values of EU countries. The key variable this research uses is the “voting coincidence”, measuring the degree to which the members of this UN’s body vote congruently with EU states in matters relating to human rights. The report shows that the voting coincidence dropped from 75% during 1998-1999 to 55% during 2007-2008 and to 52% last year.

The bulk of the countries that disengaged from the vote backing EUs perspective on human rights are in Africa, but a growing number of members that are either against EU’s votes or are abstaining from taking a position in cases of gross human rights violations are to be found in Latin America. Another group of countries in disagreement with EU’s views on human rights is the OIC, the main point of divergence being OIC’s desire to push through a resolution condemning “abuses of freedom of expression”. Moreover, the inability of EU states to impose their perspective on UNHRC’s agenda was emphasized by their disunity when the Periodic Review on China’s encroachments on human rights was released. ECFR’s report notes also the EU’s failure to coalesce a majority in its response to the crisis in Sri Lanka, but it does acknowledge its success in the case of Darfur, the more so since the majority of African countries backed the opposite view on the sanctions against Omar al-Bashir.

The most interesting part of the ECFR’s report deals with a list of suggestions to improve EU countries influence in the agenda of this body. The main points are as follows:

EU needs a long-term agenda, in order to act as a coherent agent and avoid polarizations induced by other actors (especially the USA). It must also consolidate the bilateral diplomacy with China and Russia and make efforts at building strategic coalitions on each crisis, and should also pay more attention at economic rights and development aids for poor countries. Thus, the main advice given by this report is to build a better strategy to regain the support EU’s values enjoyed in the 1990s, at the peak of the third and most impressive wave of democratization in the world. Both reports also greet the return of the US diplomacy in this UN body after a period of disengagement during the Bush administration, emphasizing an amelioration in the democratic stance of the UNHRC, for instance in the case of Darfur.

However, this optimism based on the belief that a better strategy of coalition-building of western states and the new Obama-era of American foreign policy must be moderated by a worrying trend in the global state of democracy, as the FH Freedom in the World Reports keep showing for some time now. The obstacle on the promotion of EU’s values is not so much a problem of coalitional mismanagement as a difficulty in finding democratically-oriented partners for dialogue. From the 47 members of the UNHRC, 22 are free countries (scores form 1 to 2.5), according to the FH Index, 17 others are partly free (scores from 3 to 5), and 8 are not free (5.5 to 7). Thus, the free countries are outnumbered by the partly free and not free members. Moreover, the last three FH Freedom in the World Reports show a decline of rights and liberties in the world and especially a worsening of these indices in the countries of the former Soviet Union, including Russia, and in four Latin American countries (Venezuela, Colombia, Mexico, and Nicaragua).

Furthermore, this decline in the state of democracy should be corroborated with a tendency of regional attraction exercised by not free countries or partly free countries with grave violations of democracy principles and human rights (Cuba, Russia, China, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela), cases of regional authoritarian leaders deploying a contagion effect of a non-democratic character. This authoritarian contagion (abuses against independent media, repression of opposition parties, violation of the rights of expression and association etc.) is very much visible for instance in Venezuela’s neighboring countries or the countries associated with it in ALBA (especially Ecuador, Bolivia and Nicaragua), in the Caucasus region or in some OIC countries, as well as a democratic decline in a number of African countries with strong economic ties with China.

It should also be highlighted the fact that a significant number of the UNHRC member states have received very high scores on the two scales of political rights and civil liberties, thus making their democratic credentials very much doubtful. Indeed, the proximity of more than 50% of the partly free countries to the non free bulk of states should make one wary of any easy solution to foster more democracy at the UNHRC in the short term.

On June 10, 2009, a very confusing UNHRC press release announced the results of the Universal Periodic Review on Cameroon, Cuba and Saudi Arabia. In it, a number of countries praised the democratic quality of Cuba, and the very good state of its social, economic and political rights. Among other things, that press release said as follows:  “Cuba had withstood many tests, and continued to uphold the principles of objectivity, impartiality and independence in pursuance of the realization of human rights”.

For a previous comment on this issue, see.

Andreea Nicuţar

Bellow, a table of the UNHRC member countries, according to the FH Democracy Index 2009

Munich Agreement: Neville Chamberlain, Joachim von Ribbentrop, Edouard Daladier, Adolf Hitler, Benito Mussolini, Galeazzo Ciano

The term appeasement is unpopular today both in politics and in academia as it is associated with the policy pursued by France and Great Britain towards Nazi Germany in the 1930s. The highpoint of this policy was reached on September 29, 1938 in Munich when the Western Powers gave in to Hitler’s territorial demands concerning Czechoslovakia. Since then the term has been associated with political and military weakness and treachery. This article represents the second installment in a series  dedicated to the commemorations of 70 years since the start of World War II and will deal with the political implications of appeasement. In the following lines I will outline the meaning of appeasement and its implications for the international system. My approach will draw upon the work of Robert Gilpin and of Mark R. Brawley and will concentrate on defining appeasement and explaining the political context in which it was implemented.

Appeasement is a part of a policy of retrenchment, which means reducing a nation’s foreign policy commitments in order to maintain its current position in the international system. It is a sign of a state’s relative weakness and declining power, and as such it has a negative impact on its prestige. A state can maintain its position in the international system by reducing the costs of its foreign commitments through economic, political and territorial retrenchment. It is a politically difficult strategy to implement, to carry out such a strategy is a quite a delicate matter, its success is highly uncertain and depends on timing. In the simplest form retrenchment takes the form of the unilateral abandonment of a state’s political economic and military commitment. A more complex form of retrenchment is entering into alliances and seeking rapprochement with less threatening powers. The final form of retrenchment is appeasement of a rising power by making concessions to its demands. Appeasement has become unpopular as a result of the 1938 Munich conference, when France and Great Britain gave in to German demands concerning Czechoslovakia. The fundamental problem of a policy of appeasement is to pursue it in such a manner that it does not lead to continuous deterioration in a state’s prestige and position within the international system. Retrenchment can affect a state’s relations with its allies, as their perceptions of its waning power may lead them to switch their alliance towards the rising state. Involuntary retrenchment as a result of military defeat is far worse than voluntary retrenchment as it involves a severe loss of prestige and a weakening of the state’s diplomatic standing. (Gilpin, 1983, pp. 193-194)

The diplomacy of the 1930s had been determined by strategic choices made in the 1920s by all of the great powers. It is also evident, after more than 70 years, that Britain, France and the USSR perceived Germany as a threat to the status quo, however for different reason these three countries failed to create an effective balancing coalition. In the 1920s France put an emphasis on the following strategic choices: firm alliance commitments to guarantee is security and borders, a strong League of Nations with military and intelligence capabilities (this was rejected by Britain and the US), economic reparations to weaken Germany’s potential as a great power and gain time in order to build up its armed forces against another German onslaught, disarmament as a means of easing international tensions and delay Germany’s re-armament and a weakened League of Nations, if guarantees for French security could be obtained from Britain and the US. (Brawley, 2009, pp. 81-84)

Britain favored arms limitation in order recover economically after World War I and later built up her defenses while using the League of Nations to settle international disputes. In the 1920s it refrained from giving firm alliance commitments and saw reparations as a measure of last resort to check German power. Reparations were seen as weakening European security, as an economically viable Germany was vital for Europe and for British. (Brawley, 2009, pp. 84-87)

Soviet Russia also perceived Germany as a threat, but not as intensely as the French. After the end of World War I Germany and the USSR did not share a border anymore and were considered pariah states by the rest of the international system, so the Soviets did not consider Germany an immediate threat . In the short run the USSR was willing to cooperate with the Germans and built up its economic base. In the 1920s the Soviet Union argued in favor of arms limitations and started developing its economy for war. (Brawley, 2009, pp. 87-88)

The failure to form a balancing coalition in the 1930s against Germany cannot be fully explained without understanding the political tensions existing between Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union. Great Britain avoided any firm alliance commitments because of its experience in the previous war, when it was drawn into the conflict by a crisis in the Balkans. Furthermore the British dismissed French concerns over Germany’s return to great power status and the threat it posed to France, as strategic paranoia. Britain also was suspicious of French efforts aimed at imposing severe reparations in order to delay Germany’s comeback. Relations between the USSR and the Western Powers were fraught with mutual suspicion, and few

In the 1930s the room for maneuver in response to Germany’s rise was severely constricted because of the strategic choices made in the previous decade. France soon realized that it could not compete with Germany’s economic wherewithal and adopted a defensive strategy. France’s situation was compounded by internal political and social crises and it soon abandoned any plans concerning building up any offensive military capability to strike at Germany and retreated behind the Maginot line. Britain gave up its moratorium on re-armament in the 1930s and concentrated on building up its air force and modernizing its fleet, as it most feared what was called then a “knock out blow”. Diplomatically the British used appeasement to win time and invest in their arms industry. Attempts had been made to co-opt the Soviet Union in an alliance in case of a German attack. However these diplomatic overtures were undercut by the opposition of Poland and Czechoslovakia to soviet troops crossing their territories in order to attack Germany. Moreover in the late 30s the British questioned the USSR’s ability to mount any offensive actions against Germany, because of the toll taken by Stalin’s purges on the Red Army. Stalin started to believe after Munich that the French and British security guarantees to Poland were a bluff, the French were militarily weak and that any British military contribution on the continent would have been purely symbolic. In the end Stalin preferred to throw in his lot with Hitler and agree to the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact, as he believed that bandwagoning will win him time to spare in order to prepare for a future war. (Brawley, 2009, pp. 89-95)

How should one evaluate appeasement? Appeasement failed to quail Hitler’s ambitions and reinforced his perception that the Western Powers were weak and unwilling to challenge Germany over its territorial ambitions in Central and Eastern Europe. Appeasement convinced Stalin that France and Great Britain were not serious in their efforts to deal with Germany. On the other hand appeasement bought time, however one should take this statement with a lot of salt, as the price was rather high and only Britain can actually claim that the time saved in this way proved vital later on, when it faced the German onslaught alone until 1941. Did appeasement pave the way to World War II? Appeasement should be viewed as an answer to a systemic disequilibrium within the international system however it is hard to consider it a cause of World War II. It was a mere prelude to the war.

George VIŞAN

]]> http://civitaspoliticsblog.wordpress.com/2009/09/13/appeasement/feed/ 2 745869l Bundesarchiv_Bild_183-R69173,_Münchener_Abkommen,_Staatschefs http://civitaspoliticsblog.wordpress.com/2009/09/03/world-war-ii-seventy-years-after/ http://civitaspoliticsblog.wordpress.com/2009/09/03/world-war-ii-seventy-years-after/#comments Thu, 03 Sep 2009 12:57:43 +0000 George-Adrian Visan http://civitaspoliticsblog.wordpress.com/?p=471 ]]>

World War II fighting

Few events have had such a deep impact on world history as the conflict that griped the international system seventy years ago. As all great power wars in the last five hundred years it started in Europe, with a bid a for hegemony made by a Germany, the second in twenty-five years, but it soon spread to North Africa, the Pacific and the Atlantic oceans. World War II was a total war, the second in less than a generation, and as such it involved attacks on civilians and genocide. From a military and strategic point of view it was a total war, as the aim of the war was the re-ordering of the entire international system and the destruction of some of its members; its scope was not limited to the European continent, it saw an unprecedented level of societal mobilization for the war effort in every country involved and it was prosecuted with every means available, culminating in the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

From a political point of view World War II was a hegemonic war – a war which determines which state or states will be dominant and govern the international system; the subsequent peace treaty reorders the political, territorial and basis of the international system (Gilpin, 1983, p. 15). The main function of a hegemonic war is thus to determine the hierarchy of prestige – understood here as a state’s reputation for power – and thereby who “governs” or dominates the international system (Gilpin, 1983, p.33). The French philosopher and political scientist Raymond Aron described the phenomenon of hegemonic war as “characterized less by its immediate causes or its explicit purposes than by its extent and the stakes involved. It affected all the political units inside one system of relations between sovereign states. Let us call it for want of a better term a war of hegemony, hegemony being, if not the conscious motive, at any rate the inevitable consequence of the victory of at least  one of the states or groups”(Aron, 1964, p. 359).  World War II fits these two definitions very well: it was started by Germany in order to achieve hegemony over Europe, but instead it lead to the destruction of the European great power system and its replacement by the bipolar world of the Cold War, dominated by United States and the Soviet Union. As for the states involved, the Allied camp was joined by the end of the war by 59 states, while the Axis side was supported by around 30 states and political entities.

The outcome of the war was a total re-structuring of the international system which saw the disappearance from the political map of some states (the Baltic States, Germany until the 1950s), the demise of the European colonial system and the appearance of new states, mostly former colonies. Furthermore the old order dominated by the European powers disappeared, with Britain, France and Germany becoming in the post-war world second rate powers. The clear winners and shapers of the post-war world were the powers on the fringes of the European system: the traditionally isolationist but increasingly active United States and the former outcast, the USSR. These two states fundamentally shaped the international system and imposed an international “order” that they deemed acceptable to their interests and congruent with the post-war distribution of power in the international system. Bear in mind that we are still living in a world shaped by the consequences of this war: the borders of Europe are more or less the same those that have been established at Yalta and Potsdam, the United Nations is the by-product of World War II and the global economy is still governed to a certain extent, by the Bretton Woods agreements. What does not fit the definition of hegemonic war proposed by Aron and later Robert Gilpin is the fact that post-war international system was not dominated by a single state (hegemonic), but was characterized by a political, ideological, military and economic struggle between the two victors: the United States and the Soviet Union. Some international scholars have argued that the United States was the hegemonic state of the post-war international system because of its economic potential. However such an analysis ignores the Soviet Union which challenged American power in political, military and economic terms for nearly fifty years after the end of World War II.

I will use the opportunity of the commemorations of the start of World War II to explore some of the controversial issues of this conflict. In a series of articles published on this blog during this month, I will deal with the issues of appeasement, the German-Soviet pact and the consequences of World War II for the world in which we live in today.

George VIŞAN